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Introduction 
1       Many jurisdictions provide shareholders with a legal right to seek relief where their 
interests, or those of the company, have been harmed by the company’s controllers.  Central 
to the operation of this protection in many countries – including Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Guernsey and Jersey – is the concept of “unfairly prejudicial” conduct.  Article 
141 of the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 provides that “[a] member of a company may apply 
to the court for an order under Article 143 on the ground that the company’s affairs are being 
or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its 
members generally or some part of its members”.  If the application under article 141 is well 
founded, article 143 provides the court with a broad discretion to “make such order as it 
thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of”. 
2       Articles 141 and 143 – Jersey’s unfair prejudice remedy – have been considered by the 
Privy Council in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AV v Baltic Partners Ltd.[1]  This short article 
analyses the Privy Council’s decision and considers its likely impact on the development of 
Jersey’s unfair prejudice remedy.  The Privy Council’s opinion will, however, be of wider 
interest because the UK’s unfair prejudice remedy was considered and also because of the 
propensity with which courts in other countries refer to unfair prejudice decisions from other 
jurisdictions.  
The unfair prejudice remedy 
3       Articles 141 and 143 are modelled on the UK’s unfair prejudice remedy, now found in 
sections 994 and 996 of the Companies Act 2006 but formerly sections 459 and 461 of the 
Companies Act 1985.  In Jersey and the UK, the task of defining the concepts of unfairness 
and prejudice was left to the courts.  Similarly, the courts were required to map the 
boundaries of the qua member rule: the requirement, under article 141 and sections 459 and 
994, that unfairness must prejudice the shareholder in his capacity as a shareholder of the 
company.  There are relatively few decisions concerning articles 141 and 143 and in those 
cases that have been heard in Jersey, English decisions under section 459 have been highly 
influential.[2]  A short overview of the development of section 459 – which has been 
restated, without changes, as section 994 in the Companies Act 2006 – is therefore required 
because this will place the English jurisprudence into context, particularly with regard to the 
policy issues that have shaped the remedy’s development.  It is, moreover, essential to make 
several observations concerning the Jersey courts’ reliance on English authorities.  After 
doing so, Gamlestaden will be discussed and its implications highlighted. 
4       The UK’s unfair prejudice remedy was first introduced by the Companies Act 1980.  It 
replaced section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 which provided shareholders with relief in 
respect of oppressive conduct.  The scope of section 210 was severely limited by narrow 
judicial interpretation.  In contrast, section 459 has been interpreted purposively, thereby 
transforming the rights of shareholders, particularly in small, closely held companies.  The 
courts have held that a wide range of conduct is capable of being unfairly prejudicial, 
including breaches of directors’ duties, exclusion from management, serious mismanagement 
and the payment of excessive remuneration.  Consequently, section 459 has, in practice, 
largely replaced other shareholder remedies including the derivative action and winding-up 
on just and equitable grounds.[3]  Its popularity (as section 994) in unlikely to wane 
following the introduction of a statutory derivative action under Part 11 of the Companies Act 
2006.  This is because of the wide discretion the court enjoys under section 996 and also 
because a successful section 994 action can be founded in circumstances where a shareholder 
may be precluded from bringing a derivative action on the company’s behalf. 
5       The most important section 459 decision is O’Neill v Phillips,[4] in which Lord 
Hoffmann, delivering the only reasoned opinion, articulated a twofold test of unfairness 
which stressed the contractual basis of the shareholders’ association.   In his Lordship’s view, 
unfairness arises where (1) there is a breach of the terms on which it was agreed that the 
company’s affairs would be conducted or (2) if the majority shareholders exercise a legal 
power in a manner regarded by equity as contrary to good faith.  Lord Hoffmann also 
recognised that unfairness could arise in circumstances similar to contractual frustration, 
where an event occurs which ends the basis of the shareholders’ association in circumstances 
where it is unfair for a shareholder to insist that the association should continue. 
6       The contractual based definition of unfairness in O’Neill has been followed in 
Jersey.  For example, in Robertson v Slous,[5] Lord Hoffmann’s approach was described as 
“equally relevant” for the purposes of article 141 but the court did not examine the policy 
issues upon which Lord Hoffmann based his approach and the extent to which these should 
influence the development of article 141.  This is significant because some in England have 
argued that the remedy’s scope is restricted by a contractual based definition of 
unfairness.[6]  Indeed, Lord Hoffmann acknowledged this argument in O’Neill but stated that 
a balance had to be reached between the breadth of the court’s discretion and what he 
described as the principle of legal certainty.  In his Lordship’s view, lawyers should be able 
to advise their clients whether or not a section 459 petition is likely to succeed.  Lord 
Hoffmann also added an important caveat: there is no unfairness if a reasonable offer has 
been made for the petitioner’s shares.  The motivation for this was clear: to encourage 
shareholders to resolve disputes without recourse to costly litigation.  If an offer has been 
made for the petitioner’s shares, there is little benefit in pursuing litigation because the court 
is likely to order that either the company or another shareholder buy out the petitioning 
shareholder. 
7       A further issue arises in Jersey with regard to the application of Lord Hoffmann’s 
definition of unfairness.  It has also arisen in Scotland and concerns the transplanting of legal 
concepts and principles from one jurisdiction to another.  Lord Hoffmann referred to 
equitable principles and good faith when defining unfairness.  He did so against the 
background of English law and observed that “[one] of the traditional roles of equity, as a 
separate jurisdiction, was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in certain relationships 
in which it considered that this would be contrary to good faith.  These principles have, with 
appropriate modification, been carried over into company law”.[7]  Caution must therefore be 
exercised when adopting, outside of the English legal system, Lord Hoffmann’s definition of 
unfairness because of its distinctive jurisprudential basis.  However, as Lord Hoffmann 
recognised in O’Neill when referring to constraints on legal powers, two legal systems may 
produce the same outcome through reliance on principles which appear different but which 
are functionally equivalent.  
8       Lord Hoffmann has played one of the leading roles in the development of section 459. 
His formulation of unfairness in O’Neill was not revolutionary: its antecedents can be seen in 
his earlier decisions as a judge of the English Court of Appeal[8] and High Court.[9]  During 
that time, practitioners and the judiciary became concerned with the length of section 459 
proceedings and petitioners’ tendency to cite many allegations of unfairness in order to 
bolster their case.  A contributory factor in this regard was imprecise judicial language, 
particularly the expression “legitimate expectation”, which had been used to describe those 
shareholder interests capable of protection under section 459.  In O’Neill, Lord Hoffmann 
sought to curb the loose way in which the term was being used, observing that it “should not 
be allowed to lead a life of its own, capable of giving rise to equitable restraints in 
circumstances to which the traditional equitable principles have no application”.[10]  The 
equitable constraint is therefore the source of the legitimate expectation and not the 
justification for equitable intervention.  
9       In England and Scotland the courts have confirmed that section 459 should not be used 
by shareholders to pursue interests unconnected with their capacity as a shareholder of the 
company.[11]   In part this recognises that section 459 provides relief for shareholders in 
circumstances where they have no other remedy.  Creditors and employees may be 
shareholders but they also have remedies available to them under contract and employment 
law.  This said, Lord Hoffmann has repeatedly stressed that the qua member requirement 
should not be narrowly interpreted to include only the shareholder’s strict legal rights.  This 
explains why section 459 has proved valuable for shareholders in small, closely 
companies.  Shareholders in such companies are likely to be actively involved with the 
company’s management.  Their participation may be inextricably linked with their 
investment and their association with the other shareholders.  The parties may agree that a 
shareholder will be consulted or that he will participate in the company’s management as a 
director.  But those controlling the company have the power to undermine such agreements 
by, for example, excluding a director or removing him from office under section 168 of the 
Companies Act 2006.  The English courts have made clear that this can be unfairly 
prejudicial because it defeats an understanding, not necessarily recorded in writing, regarding 
the manner in which the company’s affairs would be conducted.  This understanding forms 
part of the shareholder’s interests qua shareholder.  As we shall now see, one of the principal 
questions before the Privy Council in Gamlestaden was the scope of the shareholder’s 
interest for the purposes of article 141.  
Gamlestaden 
10     Gamlestaden was a minority shareholder in Baltic Partners Ltd. (“Baltic”), a company 
incorporated in Jersey and formed for the purpose of a joint venture.  Gamlestaden loaned 
Baltic money for this purpose and was a major creditor.  Baltic became insolvent and 
Gamlestaden brought an action under article 141, alleging breaches of directors’ duties and 
seeking an order that the directors pay damages to Baltic.  The issue before the courts was 
whether to strike out the action on the grounds that there was no reasonable cause of action.  
11     The Court of Appeal[12] upheld the Bailiff’s decision to strike out the action on the 
basis that no relief could be granted which would benefit Gamlestaden qua shareholder; only 
the creditors (including Gamlestaden) would benefit.  Clarke JA delivered the leading (and 
only reasoned) judgment in the Court of Appeal.  He relied upon Re Chesterfield Catering 
Co. Ltd.[13] in which the English High Court held that it was necessary for a shareholder 
petitioning for the winding-up of a company to demonstrate that he would gain an advantage 
qua shareholder from the winding-up.  Clarke JA believed that this formulation was 
“instructive as to what must be the effect of the relief sought, to which an applicant under art. 
141 must be able to point, in order to establish that in granting relief the court will be 
protecting his interests as a shareholder”.[14]  
12     The Privy Council rejected the Court of Appeal’s interpretation and stated that article 
141 “properly construed [does] not ipso facto rule out the grant of relief simply on the ground 
that the relief sought will not benefit the applicant in his capacity as member”.[15]  The 
appeal before the Privy Council – an application for the striking out of an article 141 action – 
precluded a detailed analysis.  Their Lordships’ opinion nevertheless raises two important 
points with regard to the operation of the unfair prejudice remedy in Jersey and the UK: the 
order sought and the scope of the shareholders’ interests that can be protected. 
13     The order sought under article 143 by Gamlestaden was the payment of damages to 
Baltic in respect of harm suffered by the company.  With reference to Re Chime Corp. 
Ltd.,[16] the Privy Council accepted that such an order could be made and viewed broadly 
the operation of article 143.  This is consistent with the position in England and Scotland,[17] 
where it is accepted that corporate relief can be provided.  This largely explains why section 
459 has supplanted the derivative action in England as the principal shareholder remedy.  The 
operation of section 459 in this regard is, however, controversial because of the long-standing 
principle in English law, associated most closely with Foss v Harbottle,[18] that the company 
is the proper claimant (plaintiff) where it has suffered harm.  This said, Lord Hoffmann 
recognised in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc[19] that section 459 can be used to “outflank” 
this principle.  The so-called Foss v Harbottle rule also applies in Jersey[20] and its 
boundaries are likely to be blurred following the Privy Council’s opinion.  It must, however, 
be noted that permitting breaches of directors’ duties to form the basis for a successful action 
under article 141 is consistent with the concept of unfairness adopted by Lord Hoffmann in 
O’Neill.  If this concept is accepted in Jersey then it follows that harm suffered by the 
company should be capable of being unfairly prejudicial under article 141.  Indeed, the 
availability of relief benefiting the company in respect of the harm it has suffered is explicitly 
recognised by article 143, which permits the court to authorise civil proceedings on the 
company’s behalf. 
15     The second issue concerns the qua member requirement.  Article 141 does not define 
the scope of the membership interest (nor do the UK’s sections 459 and 994).  In 
Gamlestaden it was argued that shareholders only have standing to bring an action under 
article 141 if the relief would benefit them qua shareholder.  The Privy Council rejected this 
argument.   With reference to the English decision R&H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical 
Ltd.,[21] their Lordships stated that it was “somewhat artificial to insist that the qualifying 
loss for article 141 (or section 459) purposes, must be loss which has reduced the value of the 
investor’s equity capital and that it is not sufficient to show that it has reduced the 
recoverability of the investor’s loan capital”.[22]  
16     Their Lordships also held that “in a case where an investor in a joint venture company 
has, in pursuance of the joint venture agreement, invested not only in subscribing for shares 
but also in advancing loan capital, the investor ought not, in their Lordships’ opinion, be 
precluded from the grant of relief under article 143(1) (or section 461(1)) on the ground that 
the relief would benefit the investor only as loan creditor and not as member”.[23] 
17     The Privy Council was right to reject the argument that relief could only be granted if it 
would benefit the shareholder qua shareholder and that the prejudice must have reduced the 
value of the shareholder’s equity.  If it is accepted that conduct harmful to the company’s 
interests can be unfairly prejudicial, then there will be circumstances where the order sought 
under section 143 does not directly benefit the shareholders.  But it does not follow, as the 
Privy Council’s opinion implies, that if the relief does not benefit the shareholder qua 
shareholder it must benefit him in some other capacity such as a creditor.   This is not 
required by article 141 or sections 459 and 994.  For example, the company benefits directly 
where a director is ordered to disgorge a gain made in breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
shareholders do not directly benefit and there is no reason why relief should be precluded on 
this basis because this would undermine the operation of the remedy.  Moreover, 
shareholders’ interests can be prejudiced in ways that do not reduce the value of their equity 
investment.  The English authorities confirm this point and in Re Elgindata Ltd.,[24] a case 
concerning alleged mismanagement, Warner J held that a reduction in the value of equity was 
not the only way of establishing that conduct was prejudicial to a shareholder’s 
interests.  Actions placing the value of the shareholders’ equity in jeopardy can be 
prejudicial.[25]  These points were not fully explored by the Privy Council.  They are 
important because they suggest that whether a shareholder directly benefits from the article 
143 relief should not be determinative of the shareholder’s standing to bring an action. 
18     The most controversial part of the Privy Council’s opinion is their Lordships’ view that 
Gamlestaden’s interests qua shareholder should include its interests qua creditor.  Their 
Lordships did not expound a general rule that shareholders who are also creditors can use 
article 141 or section 459 to protect their interests qua creditor.  It would be difficult to 
support such a rule because the purpose of the remedy is to protect the interests of 
shareholders in that capacity. The Privy Council nevertheless recognised in Gamlestaden that 
in some companies the nature of a shareholder’s involvement and participation will not be 
fully reflected in the legal rights conferred qua shareholder. This can be supported and is 
consistent with O’Neill, in which Lord Hoffmann observed: “the requirement that prejudice 
must be suffered as a member should not be narrowly or technically construed”.[26]  This 
broad interpretation explains the success of section 459 in small, so-called quasi-partnership 
companies.  However, the fact that the company is small, or has few shareholders, will not be 
sufficient for the recognition of interests and expectations beyond the shareholder’s legal 
rights.  Something more is required, as illustrated by the facts of R&H Electric Ltd., upon 
which the Privy Council relied to support its broad interpretation of the shareholder’s 
membership interest.  When Haden Bill was formed it was agreed that a minority shareholder 
would participate in management for as long as a company under his control (R&H) 
remained a creditor.  Haden Bill had been formed on the basis of mutual trust and 
confidence.  This finding enabled the court to provide relief under section 459 where the 
shareholder was removed as a director.  The trial judge held that the fact the shareholder and 
R&H were separate did not preclude relief and that the court should take a broad view of a 
shareholder’s interests qua member. 
19     The facts of Gamlestaden were very different from those in R&H Electric Ltd., not least 
because there was no evidence that Baltic was formed on the basis of mutual trust and 
confidence.  It is therefore not clear on what basis the Privy Council held that Gamlestaden’s 
interests qua shareholder were capable of including its interests qua creditor because the 
decisions cited by their Lordships were not fully analysed.  General statements from the 
English cases to which their Lordships referred – such as Arden J’s view that the section 459 
jurisdiction has an “elastic quality”[27] – do not by themselves justify an expansive view of 
the shareholder’s interests.  Their Lordships’ opinions nevertheless suggest that in a joint 
venture a shareholder’s interests capable of protection under section 459 can include his 
interests qua creditor without the need for establishing that the relationship was formed on 
the basis of mutual trust and confidence. 
20     The extent to which such a broad interpretation was necessary in Gamlestaden must be 
questioned because where a company has suffered harm there is nothing in article 141 (or the 
UK’s section 994) which requires that the shareholder must directly benefit from the relief 
sought.  Moreover, the Privy Council leaves unanswered several important questions, the 
most important of which concerns the arrangements that will constitute a joint venture.  The 
joint venture appellation can accurately describe the association between many shareholders 
in small, closely held companies, where shareholders have subscribed for shares and provided 
loan capital.  As such, the Privy Council’s decision expands significantly the breadth of those 
interests which individual shareholders can protect using article 141.  The difficulty is that 
conflicts can arise between the interests of a shareholder qua shareholder and qua creditor 
where, e.g., a company’s directors reach a decision in the best interests of the company (as a 
separate legal entity) but which conflicts with the interests of a loan creditor.  Should article 
141 be used as a forum for such disputes?  Would it not be better for creditors to take action 
on the basis of their contract with the company?  
Concluding comments 
21     The development of Jersey company law owes much to English company law, 
particularly in the field of shareholder remedies.  Gamlestaden provides an excellent example 
but its implications reach beyond Jersey.  The Privy Council has expanded the scope of 
article 141 and section 994 by holding that the remedy can protect a shareholder’s interests 
qua creditor in the absence of a relationship of mutual trust and confidence.  In Jersey the 
decision is likely to reduce shareholders’ reliance on the derivative action and, in this regard, 
Jersey may see – as the UK has done – the blurring of the boundaries between conduct giving 
rise to a remedy for the company and that providing a remedy for the shareholder. 
Robert Goddard BA, LLM is a lecturer in law at Aston University. 
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